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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 23-10063-shl
4	x
5	In the Matter of:
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7	GENESIS GLOBAL HOLDCO, LLC,
8	
9	Debtor.
10	x
11	United States Bankruptcy Court
12	One Bowling Green
13	New York, NY 10004
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15	October 6, 2023
16	10:09 AM
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21	BEFORE:
22	HON SEAN H. LANE
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
24	
25	ECRO: ALIANNA PERSAUD

	Page 2
1	HEARING re Doc. #779 Notice of Agenda
2	
3	HEARING re Doc. #711 Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant
4	to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 Authorizing the Issuance of
5	Subpoenas for the Production of Documents by the Debtors
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25	Transcribed by: Sonya Ledanski Hyde

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13	ANDREW BEHLMANN
14	BARNWELL BRENDON
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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Sean Lane in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, and we're here for a 10:00 in Genesis Global Hold Co., LLC., a Chapter 11 case. So we'll start with appearances. Let me find out who's here for the Debtors. Oh, I'm not on. All right. Good morning. This is Judge Sean Lane in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, and we're here for a 10:00 hearing in Genesis Global Hold Co., LLC. So let me find out who is here from various parties starting with the Debtors. MR. BAREFOOT: Good morning, Your Honor. Luke Barefoot from Cleary Gottlieb for Genesis the Debtors.

THE COURT: Good morning. And on behalf of the Official Committee?

MR. WEST: Good morning, Your Honor. Colin West of White and Case on behalf of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

THE COURT: All right. And on behalf of Three Arrows Capital?

MR. MOHEBBI: Good morning, Your Honor. You have Nima Mohebbi from Latham and Watkins along with my partner Adam Goldberg.

THE COURT: Good morning. And I -- this is always 25

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the case in matters like this. We have many pages of appearances, but I'm not quite sure who actually intends to appear beyond the folks identified thus far. So rather than go through that lengthy list, I'll just throw it open, find out if there's anyone else who wishes to make an appearance here this morning. All right. In light of the fact that no one else has stepped forward, we can proceed. I do have the agenda for today's hearing. That's filed at Docket 779.

And I did receive communication from my courtroom deputy that the discovery conference that was requested is no longer necessary because the parties have worked out their issues. I appreciate that fact that the parties obviously spent some time to work through issues. Thank you very much. And so I think the only thing that is left is the Rule 2004 Motion, which also, based on the reply, appears to have sort of been reduced to a single issue.

I will say I have one issue to add to the list, and it's sort of a scheduling procedure issue. And so let me get that out of the way. We had talked about -- and I think perhaps it was at my behest or not, but about how to deal with the Three Arrows consolidation motion and when to hear it and how to work out all the schedules associated with that. And after seeing that motion filed in many other cases, I ran into Judge Glenn and we started talking about whether for purposes of here in the Southern District for

convenience and for efficiency's sake, but without it being any comment on the merits or demerits of the consolidation motion itself, whether it made sense for Judge Glenn and I to have a joint hearing just to discuss the matters.

Because I certainly suspect all parties would be attending all these different hearings.

And he had some time, and I have some time on the 23rd at 3:00 if we wanted to break out that one motion from the calendar that's on the next day here. I didn't want to do that without talking to folks because it's not intended to send any profound message about my view about the merits of the motion or anything of that sort. And I know that without communicating with the parties, sometimes doing things like that people will try to read the tea leaves. And here, there are no tea leaves really to read other than at the administrative convenience of the court.

So let me ask. I'll start with Three Arrows

Capital since it's its motion whether it has a view or not

on that as a -- just as a procedural matter.

MR. GOLDBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. Adam

Goldberg of Latham and Watkins for Three Arrows Capital for
the record. We would be happy to reschedule the hearing for
the 23rd at 3 p.m. I think that just for the sake of
completeness would entail what we've referred to as the
coordination motion together with our motion for relief from

stay and the related motion to seal.

THE COURT: I don't know. That's -- that is a question of whether it would include the relief from stay motion really because relief from stay is dealing with the merits of each case and while there's overlap. So we might think about whether that -- is there a motion for relief from the automatic stay in the other cases?

MR. GOLDBERG: Well, Your Honor, Judge Glenn had our Chapter 15 case. He also has the Celsius case.

THE COURT: Yeah. No, I guess I'd be referring to the Celsius case, whether there's a motion for stay relief in that case.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes, Your Honor. So we will be -I think we're amending the request to the Court as it
relates to Celsius. I'd like to be clear that Latham and
Watkins does not represent Three Arrows Capital on any
matter related to Celsius. Our co-counsel at Holland and
Knight is advising the (indiscernible) and Three Arrows
Capital on those issues. We have not -- the -- I should -just for the sake of facts, I would say that a companion
coordination motion has not been filed in the Celsius case.

There has been a motion for relief from stay filed in the Celsius case, which is on a somewhat different basis than the one presented --

THE COURT: Yeah. So --

Pg 12 of 62 Page 12 1 MR. GOLDBERG: -- in this court. 2 THE COURT: So yeah. I guess I had assumed there was a motion -- a coordination motion filed in Celsius. 3 4 you're saying the only coordination motion that Judge Glenn 5 has is in the Chapter 15 case? 6 MR. GOLDBERG: That's right. 7 THE COURT: And the only stay relief motion he has 8 is in the Celsius case, but it's done by different counsel 9 on different grounds. 10 MR. GOLDBERG: That's right, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right. That does raise the 12 question of whether it is appropriate to have a joint 13 hearing because I don't know that I -- the question of 14 overlap, the Chapter 15 -- I assumed there was a Chapter 11 15 -- a similar Chapter 11 motion for coordination that Judge 16 Glenn had. Well, anyhow, I can't sort of figure out those 17 puzzle pieces at the moment, but I appreciate the factual 18 clarification. 19 MR. GOLDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. And I think 20 you're not off base. We I think had originally anticipated 21 seeking to coordinate Celsius as well, and I think as we've 22 refined and evaluated those issues it will be clear that in 23 our proposed order related to the coordination motion, we

would not be seeking to include the Celsius case in that

coordination.

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THE COURT: All right. All right. So let me hear from the Debtors.

MR. BAREFOOT: Good morning, Your Honor. Luke
Barefoot from Cleary Gottlieb for the Debtors. I think you
covered much of what I wanted to say in terms of, look, if
you wanted to have a joint hearing just with Judge Glenn in
respect of his oversight of the Chapter 15 proceedings, I
think that we would certainly understand the reasons for
that. I think for many of the reasons Mr. Goldberg just
laid out, I think Celsius really is a different animal both
in terms of, you know, the -- that they're not in
coordination (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Yeah. I think -- I think when I heard the preview, I had assumed that there was going to be one and that they were sort of going to -- obviously, each case has -- would have its own wrinkles. But it sounds like there's not that level of parallel action here. And so it really would just be if there was a joint hearing then on -- it doesn't make any sense to talk about the stay relief motions at that hearing. It would just really be to talk about coordination, the motion that's been filed in the 15 case and here, although they are different by virtue of the fact that one's a 15 and one's a 1011.

MR. MOHEBBI: Your Honor, just so (indiscernible), and I think you covered this largely whenever we originally

talked about moving the date for the hearing on the listing motion, there is very much part and parcel and a lot of overlap between the grounds for the list day motion and the coordination motion not for the reason that it was adjourned so that they could file their coordination motion and have those put together. I'm not sure it makes a lot of sense to segregate those two at this point given that the overlapping issue.

THE COURT: All right. All right. Yes. And I apologize for -- the minute we sort of set this up and had a conversation about it, and so to clear the air on it, and then this wrinkle came up about this possibility, which is -- which makes sense to discuss. So -- but it also represents a level of uncertainty. So I'm going to talk to Judge Glenn about it.

Again, I think I had thought that there was going to be a coordination motion in Celsius, and I think those would then be by definition similarly -- that would be similarly situated to this motion. And there might be sufficient overlap to make it sensible. I'm not -- given what you just said about the stay relief motion, which doesn't come as a surprise, I'm not quite sure it is efficient or sensible. I don't know that Judge Glenn wants to have to sit through all that.

So here's what I'll do. We'll leave everything

Page 15 1 status quo until I talk to Judge Glenn. If we decide that 2 for purposes of venting issues, essentially, and having a 3 discussion, then it would be helpful to have the hearing as a joint hearing. Then we'll let you know. But again, 4 5 there's no messaging here in terms of my views on the 6 ultimate merits of any of the requests. It's just a matter 7 of what the discussion looks like really. So Mr. Barefoot, 8 anything else you wanted to share on that subject? 9 MR. BAREFOOT: No, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 MR. BAREFOOT: We'll wait for (indiscernible) on 12 that. 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you so much. And I 14 don't know if the Committee wants to be heard on that. 15 don't have to be, but I didn't want to preclude them from 16 chiming in. 17 MR. WEST: Colin West, Your Honor, from White and Case for the Committee. No, Your Honor. I think you now 18 19 have all of the relevant background procedural facts, and I 20 don't think we have anything to add. 21 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. All 22 I appreciate your indulgence in chatting about this, right. 23 and with that, we can turn to the matters that are on the agenda, which is the Rule 2004 motion. And since it's Three 24 25 Arrow Capital motion, I thought I would start with them.

And I have read all the papers. I have my stickies, I have my Rules of Civil Procedure that are incorporated in the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for thinking about how to sort these things out.

And I will start with this question. So there's a discussion in the reply talking about the -- essentially as frankly the one issue that's left, which is the request for all documents and communications from the June 14, 2022 through July 31, 2022 concerning the assignment of certain claims from Genesis to DCG as set forth in the assignment assumption of master loan agreement executed July 14, 2022. That seems to be the only issue left.

I guess I was trying to figure out in light of the fact that there has been some production of information and some coordination, no pun intended, among the parties to try to remove issues, I'm trying to figure out, and I'll ask. Three Arrows Capital this, am I looking at this still from the point of view at 2004, or am I really looking at it from the point of view of discovery in a contested matter, right?

So the motion said 2004. The response said no, it's not 2004, it's -- we've already moved onto a contested matter under the rules, and that's the way we look at it.

And in fact, there is a discussion in the reply then about relation back and all those kinds of questions. And so I ask because there's a different standard in Rule 2004 than

there is in a contested matter.

I don't know that that -- differing standards would be dispositive here, but I at least, as a judge, want to know what the rules of the road are. When I open my rule book, what page should I be opening to when I consider the last item that's on the agenda here? And I guess it also was a question that occurred to me given that there was some production, additional production, and what the parties thought they were doing or not doing.

Now, I don't want to overthink it. Parties may be saying, Judge, however you think about it, we just didn't want to fight about certain issues, so we just produced documents. If that's the answer, that's fine. But from Three Arrows Capital -- from the view of Three Arrows

Capital having seen the objection and having gotten additional documents, is this a 2004 question still, or is this really a contested matter and we're looking at the rule incorporated, you know, Rule 26?

MR. MOHEBBI: It's a 2004 matter, Your Honor. And it is absolutely true that the parties worked through several issues in response, and we appreciate the Debtors' work in that respect. But we do think this is a 2004 issue because it relates to a claim that has not been asserted yet. And --

THE COURT: Well, but here -- so -- all right. So

-- but then it raises the following question. You're saying it's unrelated for purposes of analyzing it as a 2004 versus a contested matter, but then you say it will relate back, which seems to say it has to be related to a pending claim. So I'm not -- how are you threading that particular intellectual needle?

MR. MOHEBBI: Well, there's two points here, Your Honor. The first is the question of whether -- the only reason we discussed relating back is because the Debtors in response don't disagree that we meet the standard of 2004. We say -- they say the claims are time-barred. Now, if you look at the standard, what we're saying is that even if -- first of all, Your Honor doesn't have to address that question right now.

There's a lot of cases, including the In re
Millenium Labs case, that talks about the court not having
to "speculate" over the merits of the causes of action, or
whether or not there's even subject matter jurisdiction or
anything. The question is only whether or not in the
context of the specific motion the Court has the power to
evaluate.

Now, on the relation back question, it's not that the claims are not -- in order to relate back, they have to rise from the common -- or the same common core facts.

THE COURT: Well, they have the standard.

MR. MOHEBBI: Now --

THE COURT: We all understand the standard, but I guess my thought is they're saying there's no point here because these claims can't be asserted, and you're saying they can be asserted because they would relate back. But if they relate back to what's in the current operative claim, then they're part of the contested matter, aren't they? I mean, if they're that close, how is it that they're entirely unrelated?

I don't know how you can make those two -- I understand how you got there in terms of the different issues and challenges, but I'm just trying to figure out how to reconcile that, that they're both simultaneously entirely unrelated so 2004 is still okay notwithstanding the pending claims in the contested matter. But then once we get past that, if there's an issue about whether they can be asserted, you've told me and the rest of the world that, well, then they will be related. And so how can they be entirely unrelated now?

MR. MOHEBBI: Well, because we're talking about two different standards. It's not the -- again, we're talking about --

THE COURT: But they both use the word related.

They use related, and then they put an "un" in front of it

MR. MOHEBBI: Understand. Well, relate --

2 THE COURT: -- and say unrelated.

MR. MOHEBBI: Relate back. Relate back. In other words, same commonality of facts, not necessarily the same claim. We're talking about a potential fraud claim (indiscernible).

THE COURT: No, it doesn't have to be the same claim. But the idea is, right, we've all seen cases, folks who are litigators say, well, you know, there's discovery and I'm going to amend my complaint because what I've learned in discovery is just some additional facts in the scope of what I'm arguing is tweaked, whether I've got something -- the same facts and some additional facts that open up some additional legal avenues, or maybe greater damages, or whatever it is.

But they're sort of rooted together, and I'm just

-- so that's sort of how you look at that because I'm

dumbing it down. But it -- for Rule 2004, it has -- to -
and the Debtors have argued this. It can't be Rule 2004.

Now, again, I don't want to get hung up on it because maybe

your argument is it is potentially related. Maybe we should

do it under Rule 26, and then we should have that

discussion. But I am -- I'll stop talking now and I'll let

you talk. I am struggling with that. It does seem to be

sort of two sides of the same coin. It's not exactly the

same legal test, but they'll sort of run into each other at some point intellectually. And that seems to be a collision course that they're on at the moment.

MR. MOHEBBI: Sure, Your Honor. I mean, look, I think stepping back for a second, I wanted to take these two points in order. We are Debtor too. This relates to a massive claim we have. I think it would help me to explain a little bit exactly what the fraudulent transfer theory means here and where you can see that sort of Venn diagram that you're alluding to. What we're talking about here is in -- out of all of the claims that we've asserted against Genesis in this matter are of the way of preference and turn over.

Instances where Genesis in the lead-up to the
Three Arrows, our Debtor's liquidation, foreclosed on
certain assets that we claimed, hundreds of millions of
assets that we claim that they shouldn't have foreclosed on.
Now, between that small period, that two-week period or
three-week period, whatever it is, that we're asking for
documents, we filed for liquidation. And you know, two
weeks after we filed for liquidation, Genesis assigns all of
its linear relationship to DCG, and now they don't want to
provide documents about these issues.

Now what our suspicion is here is that Genesis first foreclosed on those assets only then to assign to DCG

Page 22 1 in order to eliminate mutuality and prevent us from setoff 2 rights in the BBI. Basically, assigned away turn over --3 this is a -- we couldn't essentially set off against them in 4 the BBI. Now, the claims are related only in the sense that 5 we're talking about the same linear relationship that was 6 transferred. However, the theory here is that DCG and 7 Genesis did this precisely to get a significant advantage 8 vis-a-vis other Creditors. 9 And otherwise there would be -- I mean, the fact 10 that they're refusing to provide communication surrounding 11 that window, they're essentially frustrating hundreds of 12 millions of dollars in recovery, not even letting us see the 13 intent. 14 THE COURT: Well, I -- again --15 MR. MOHEBBI: So... 16 THE COURT: You know, whenever you have questions 17 about whether you can assert certain claims, you know, it is what it is. So I still have to run the drill. So --18 19 MR. MOHEBBI: Sure. 20 THE COURT: -- in your view under those factual 21 circumstances, it can both be unrelated so as to allow you 22 to do this by 2004 but potentially related for purposes of relation back? 23 24 MR. MOHEBBI: That's exactly correct, Your Honor.

And I think that the cases that we've cited state that --

I'll also note one more thing.

THE COURT: So what would be your best case on that? Because again, I understand the concepts are different, but it is -- they do use the same word, related and then unrelated. And so I'd be curious if there's -- I haven't gotten a chance to look. I've read your papers several times, but I haven't gotten a chance to look at specific cases. So I'd be interested if there is a case that talks about the, pun intended, relationship between the being unrelated and being related. Because it's not -- it's a bit of a slippery concept.

MR. MOHEBBI: Correct.

THE COURT: And so any particular case that you would have me read?

MR. MOHEBBI: Sure. I actually think it would be helpful to read both Debtors' cases and the standard case, but we're happy to submit additional briefing. I would just point you to the --

THE COURT: No, no, I don't want additional briefing. I guess we all know everybody cites cases. We often cite a lot of cases, but we also know that often there is a case or two that is particularly salient to a particular issue. So that's really what I'm asking you is

MR. MOHEBBI: Sure.

THE COURT: -- of the cases cited in your briefs, the motion or the reply, is there a particular one that you think addresses the intersection between relation back for purposes of amendment and something being unrelated for purposes of Rule 2004?

MR. MOHEBBI: The short answer is, Your Honor, nothing directly on point as to that particular issue. In fact -- but there is the In re Frontier Communications case, which is 641 B.R. 64, does say that -- it lays out that this -- what I think the standard that delineates this issue, which is to determine whether an amendment relates back, a court must decide whether there is a sufficient commonality of facts.

And the point being focused on the facts as opposed to the -- and I would also note that Genesis in their cases, they don't cite a single case that deals with Rule 2004. All of their cases dealt with solely this question of amendment. So we're looking into that right now, and we're going to try to get back to you by the end of the hearing if there's a specific case that deals with the intersection.

THE COURT: Well, the -- what they cited was the pending proceeding rules, and I have decisions, written decisions on both I think the relation back certainly. And I know I do, and I've certainly issued decisions, I can't

remember if they're bench rulings or not, on the pending proceeding rule. And so -- and that the question is, again, they're related. So -- all right.

MR. MOHEBBI: And they made that argument only with respect to the Grayscale claims. They did not make the pending proceeding argument with respect to the assignment claims that we have right now.

THE COURT: So while they -- so let me ask you a separate question that I don't want to forget. Is -- there's a discussion in the Debtor's objection talking about -- and also in your papers talking about the reservation of rights language. And I'm trying to figure out how much water you're seeking to have that particular reservation of rights language carry in this particular context, whether it actually is going to be the thing you cite to for purposes of relation back, or it's just a fact and it's, you know, in your view, a good fact so you want me to know it. So I -- and the -- so any view that you have on that would be helpful.

MR. MOHEBBI: Sure, Your Honor. Thank you. You know, I think the relation back -- or the reservation of rights language I think was -- has to viewed in the context of the situation that the liquidators are in. I think first, the liquidators began this liquidation with a monumental task. As in every sort of large Debtor case,

Your Honor, the Debtors had -- or the JLs had numerous issues that had to be dealt with, you know, with no cooperation from the founders talking about (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: Now, I understand you're in a challenging factual situation. But I guess the question is does the fact that that language exist change the calculus at all for what I have to look at.

MR. MOHEBBI: I think it does because we've reserved rights and we, you know, mentioned the assignment. This all goes to their -- the question of undue prejudice. And so they knew we were actively investigating. We complied with their claims objection or the claims deadlines that they set in their initial plans.

And they cited -- I mean, they attached the amendment to their own objection. So our view is that there is really no prejudice for, you know, just allowing us to investigate what could be a tremendous issue here that relates to the financial condition of the estate. That's rule 2004(b). The financial condition we're allowed as a Debtor to investigate, including under -- in our Chapter 15. We're allowed as a Debtor to investigate claims that go to the financial condition of the estate.

And we're only talking about a very small period here. Talking about three weeks of communications, which

Page 27 1 again, very surprising that --THE COURT: Well --2 MR. MOHEBBI: -- they've agreed to produce 3 (indiscernible). Except for that (indiscernible) --4 5 THE COURT: But to back up for a second, you 6 mentioned as a Debtor, you're entitled to do this, that, and 7 the other thing. You're not the Debtor here, so if you have a request as a debtor, those are traditionally made in the 8 9 debtor's cases, right? And so I understand you're here 10 making a request as a creditor. And so I'm not sure it 11 matters one way or the other, but you're not the Debtor 12 here. And you know, it is what it is. 13 The -- so I assume that your -- well, let me sort 14 of take a different tact here. So you've resolved the other 15 issues dealing with Grayscale, so now there's just this 16 other matter dealing with the -- that particular assignment. 17 So the way you see it, you don't have anything in your current claim that covers that. But you think it's sort of 18 19 factually related that you previewed because it's sort of 20 about the parties' relationship. 21 MR. MOHEBBI: Exactly. 22 THE COURT: All right. So to loop back to the other issue, I quess my question is a matter of policy. I'm 23 -- there's a bit of a challenge to allowing a reservation of 24 25 rights language to open a door wider than it would otherwise

in these circumstances because, frankly, if that's the case laws, everybody will add a reservation of rights language, and it doesn't -- it really won't mean anything. So I don't know for relation back that it's going to really make any -- I understand it may affect -- so the -- I'm having trouble understanding how that can actually open the window broader than it would be otherwise.

MR. MOHEBBI: Sure.

THE COURT: I think the equities are the equities in the sense of the case you walked into and circumstances. But I'm just -- the reservation of rights seems to be more of a pro forma thing. And if it has that kind of weight, then everybody will use it, and then it'll really have no meaning at all. And so I'm just not sure. But is there anything else you want to cite to me or point out on that issue?

MR. MOHEBBI: Sure, Your Honor. Just two more things. I think, you know, you mentioned that looking at the reservation of rights language, I think a lot of these questions are really not before you. I mean, I think fundamentally just to take things back, this is a question about whether or not we should get Rule 2004 discovery. I think very fundamentally the standard is met.

The In re Millenium Lab Holdings case -- and I will just make a quote from this case, "As many -- as

Page 29 1 numerous courts have recognized when presented with a 2004 2 motion, there is no way to determine where the 3 investigations will lead, what claims may be revealed, and 4 what issues are core or non-core. Thus, in order to grant a 5 Rule 2004 motion, a court need not speculate over causes of 6 action that may be pursued." The reality is --7 THE COURT: No, I understand that, but the --8 MR. MOHEBBI: -- beyond (indiscernible) --9 THE COURT: If you just look at Rule 2004 in 10 isolation with -- say there's no claims, there's nothing, 11 it's a timely filed Rule 2004, we're wondering about claims 12 and liabilities and it's -- and it comes early on in the 13 case, nothing else has happened, I agree. And that's sort 14 of what that language does. 15 The problem is it's been implicated -- more than 16 that has been implicated here because the idea is, well, so 17 if you look at Rule 26, which is incorporated to contested 18 matters, for example, you know, there's a discussion about 19 whether the burdens outweigh the likely benefit. 20 And the Debtors have said, well, there's no 21 benefit at all. It's time barred. And so -- and your 22 response to that is, well, it really wouldn't be because 23 it's -- it would be something we could relate back. 24 MR. MOHEBBI: That's right. 25 THE COURT: And then that sort of raises, you

know, the question about is it -- is that really then 2004. So it's a bit of an unusual factual circumstance here, and I haven't seen a circumstance where I've had that tension. So I agree with you. We all know what the standard is for Rule 2004. And if this were a simple isolated one issue kind of Rule 2004 request, I don't think we'd be here today. But it's not.

So you've answered a lot of questions, and I really appreciate your nimbly jumping from one issue to another. And so I did want to give you a chance to address anything else you wanted to address before I hear from the other side.

MR. MOHEBBI: Sure, Your Honor. Just the one last thing I would note here is just considering the equities here, I think you mentioned that, and I think that that is, stepping back, an important consideration here. And I would just ask that the Court do that. And in particular, if the Court were to determine our standing here as a Creditor, I would ask that any sort of decision be without prejudice for us to be able to seek this same discovery in our Chapter 15.

The reason we seek -- we're seeking it here is because Mr. -- or the other Debtors have basically insisted on us being at -- handling all these discovery disputes in this case. This relates to a tremendously potentially valuable claim that we have against the Debtors. It's a

minor burden on them. We're talking two weeks of it -- of communications. This is not something that we think is going to dramatically change things.

And they can make the same arguments as to whether or not this is time barred if we find communications that give us additional claims and assert them in an amended proof of claim. They're perfectly able to do that, you know, move to dismiss, file a motion for summary judgment, and defend those claims. There's no prejudice. And so we just would ask that the Court consider those factors in making a decision here.

THE COURT: All right. So let me just make sure I understand the timeframe. You keep saying two weeks. I think it's June 14th through July 31st. So I think it's about --

MR. MOHEBBI: Oh, right.

THE COURT: -- a month and a half. So not to be too persnickety, but I understand the agreement was executed July 14th. Why does it make sense to ask for things beyond that date? If the agreement has already been signed, sealed, and delivered, wouldn't it be appropriate to have it up through that date? Because if people have views about something that's already happened, I suppose -- but you know, and that would make it a month as opposed to six weeks.

Page 32 1 MR. MOHEBBI: That's -- I mean, I think that would 2 be a reasonable middle ground approach, Your Honor. And I think -- but you know, I -- we do think the communications 3 after would potentially be relevant because it would go to 4 the intent of the assignment. But if Your Honor's inclined 5 6 to narrow it, we will take (indiscernible) on that front 7 because we do think it's important. 8 THE COURT: All right. All right, counsel. 9 Anything else to -- that we should discuss before I hear 10 from the other side? 11 MR. MOHEBBI: No, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. All 13 right. Let me hear from the Debtors. 14 MR. BAREFOOT: Good morning, Your Honor. 15 (Indiscernible) Cleary Gottlieb for the Debtors. 16 THE COURT: Oh, Mr. Barefoot, you're breaking up a 17 little bit. 18 MR. BAREFOOT: Can you hear me now? 19 THE COURT: Yeah, that's better. So it might be a 20 microphone issue more than an internet connectivity. 21 MR. BAREFOOT: Okay. I'll try to lean as close to 22 the computer as I can. Your Honor, there are two points 23 that Mr. Mohebbi and I are in (indiscernible) agreement on, and I think those two points are determinative. One is that 24 25 these requests relate to a claim that has not yet been

asserted, and that the only available mechanism for discovery here is Rule 2004 for that reason.

These claims -- it makes very little sense from an estate resources perspective to require the estate to collect documents, produce documents, have (indiscernible) all in service an assertion of a claim that was not timely asserted and can't be asserted. In terms of the distinctions, it's very helpful and important to look at the difference between -- in terms of the way the proof of claim pled the allegations starting Grayscale that we've now resolved through agreements to make an additional production.

Specifically, they didn't understand completely and frame them as potential claims relating to Grayscale. But they put the estate on notice they had potential claims, and were intending to potentially assert claims relating to Grayscale. They never did that whatsoever concerning transactions between the Debtors and DCG. The proof of claim is replete with references to an explanation how it challenges transaction between and transfers between Three Arrows and the Debtors.

No where does it put the estate on notice or indicate that it was intending to or reserving the right to challenge transactions between the Debtors and DCG. And that's a very important distinction both because it's an

entirely different party, and it's temporally distinct. It happened, you know, a month after Three Arrows defaulted and the Debtors foreclosed.

Your Honor, I don't see that there is any room or breathing space between saying these claims were not -- do not relate to the existing contested matter, and they don't because they weren't asserted. but yet, nonetheless, asserting that these claims can somehow relate back. And to the extent that that is not -- it is hanging its hat on a generic reservation of rights, that's obviously not sufficient.

And the estate, the Three Arrows estate, knew how the potential claims that it might not yet have all the facts on. Maybe the potential claims, to the extent that they ever commenced a Chapter 11 case in order for this exact reason, to put everyone on notice that they may intend in the future to assert those claims. They never did --

THE COURT: So let me make sure I understand. So in terms of the different ways that you look at it, the objection -- and people's positions have shifted. And so the objection says we have objections to their claims, and you can't use 2004 because it's covered by a pending proceeding. And so -- but what I'm hearing now is, essentially in your view, they've said it isn't under Rule 2004. And okay, it's not. And that -- and so there seems

to be sort of a slight maturation or progression of views on that.

So maybe you can give me wholistically what in your objection you sort of still adhere to and what you don't. Because clearly, the objection says there is a pending matter, you don't get 2004. And then we get into Rule 26 and whether the claim is, you know, timely or not. But what's your thinking on that?

MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, the distinction here is, and I think Mr. Mohebbi alluded to this, when we filed out objection, we were still fighting about both the Grayscale claims, which are in their proof of claim, and about this final claim relating to unasserted claims concerning the assumption and assignment agreement between the Debtors and DCG. So we 100 percent would stand by the position that the Grayscale claims are a contested matter. They are the subject of our pending amended claims objection, and therefore, you can't get Rule 2004 with those.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BAREFOOT: I think we're all in agreement that that's not the case for the assumption (indiscernible) because there were no claims made in the proof of claim in determining the assumptions.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. That's helpful

to have on the record for purposes of making it clear what we're doing and what we're not doing. All right. So it does seem then everyone agrees this is appropriate for Rule 2004 because it's not related. And where you part company is that from their point of view, let's leave for another day what to do with the potential claim. And from your point of view, there's no point in doing that because it's something that is unrelated. It is by definition problematic from a relation back point of view.

MR. BAREFOOT: And I think, Your Honor, that goes to the cause (indiscernible). You know, while, as Mr.

Mohebbi has said in many contexts courts might say, you know, I don't need to specify at this point what the contours of this claim (indiscernible), etcetera. We are in a different factual scenario here where the bar date has passed and claims were even amended after that, and these claims were simply never asserted. So to state that there's cause for what is effectively going to be an exercise in futility would really only be a poor use of estate resources.

THE COURT: So two questions. I just want to make it clear from the record what you think Three Arrows Capital should've done here under its circumstances, right? Because certainly there's an undercurrent of we're doing the best with what we have under the circumstances, and therefore the

equities lie with us. I'm not sure where the equities get siloed in my analysis here. I suppose the -- it's a preview into the relation back second prong. But what is your view in terms of considering those equities in sort of fairness generally. And just getting and understanding, what do you think should've happened if you were in their shoes?

MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, I understand that they may not have all the facts that they would like to have.

They assert that -- to support a potential fraudulent conveyance claim to challenge a transaction that occurred in July between the Debtors and DCG. There are many other categories of claims, including their (indiscernible) claims where they similarly don't have the facts to completely plead any cause of action, but they put the estate on notice that they intended to preserve the ability to assert that claim later and to take discovery on it.

They never said boo about the assumption assignment agreement, about any transactions between the Debtors and DCG. The entire other focus of their claims is on transactions between Three Arrows the Debtors. So, yes, they are third parties, and they were appointed now that -- 15 months ago. But they were appointed a year before the bargaining. But they certainly knew as of that point how to make clear when they intended to reserve their rights to assert a claim on the setbacks in the future. And they

simply didn't do that with respect to the assumption and assignment agreement or any other transaction to the Debtors' interest.

THE COURT: Well, is there an argument that they wouldn't have known enough to do that? When did the assumption and assignment agreement become known to folks?

Again, I'm not -- I don't -- I could see it from this vantage point, not from all of your vantage point in terms of understanding those kind of facts and when things come to light.

MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, I think you've heard the fact that there were even prior to the bar date a number of discussions between representatives of Three Arrows and representatives of the Debtors. The assumption is (indiscernible) out in the open at that point. In any event, it was in our disclosure statement. It was in our original claims objection. They then amended their claims in response to that, and we still see nothing about claims relating to the assumption of assignment.

THE COURT: All right. So a couple of other things to ask you about. One is the timing of this relation back issue. So I understand that you're saying there's no point to this. You certainly -- I get your argument. I have gotten in some ways, I wouldn't even say half a loaf, but three-quarters of a loaf of if I had a motion seeking to

amend a complaint or a claim to relate back.

I haven't gotten sort of the full -- what a full motion would look like because that would normally say, well, here's the language in our claim, and here's this.

And so I have a lot of it, but probably not quite all of it.

And that raises the question about timing in terms of my ability to rely on it at this point in time for Rule 2004.

So what do I do with that conundrum if that's the argument you want me to rely upon to say there's no point in doing this? It's not a fishing expedition. It's going out in a boat without a rod or a reel. There's nothing that can -- good that can happen from this. So what's your take on that?

MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, I think you do have what you need in front of you. But to the extent that you would like supplemental briefing, we would be happy to.

THE COURT: All right. And I guess the other question I would have is about burden, right? So we're all practical people here, and so I think I've already pushed back a little bit on the timeframe in question of six weeks as opposed to, say, four weeks. And oftentimes people say, well, do your -- so if you think of it as a traditional adversary, you would say, well, do your discovery and then we'll -- people will file their motions and sort it all out.

Again, I sort of have kind of a three-quarters

view of that at this point. So I'm not sure, and perhaps you can enlighten me as to what the burden is here and how relevant or irrelevant that is to me figuring out what to do going forward.

MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, I don't have in front of me, you know, statistics to say we've done hit counts, and it's X thousands of documents. Part of the reason for that is that this is temporally distinct from all the other discovery that we've been engaged in. So we would have to do a supplemental pull and collection and then run search terms and hits in order to do this. It is temporally distinct, but we have to (indiscernible).

THE COURT: All right. So I guess you're not in a position to say how helpful or not helpful it would be to shrink the time period from six weeks to four weeks.

MR. BAREFOOT: I can't give you a numerical parameter around that, Your Honor, but obviously if you're going to order discovery, we would certainly agree with Your Honor to supposition then what could be the relevance of post-execution communications.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Barefoot, thank you for hopping around from various different topics. I appreciate it, and I certainly want to give you a chance to add any other points you would like to before I ask the Committee to chime in.

23-10063-shl Doc 792 Filed 10/11/23 Entered 10/11/23 16:30:22 Main Document Pq 41 of 62 Page 41 1 MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, the only final point I 2 wanted to make, which is something I should've added when 3 you asked, you know, how well-known was it out there that 4 the assignment agreement existed. DCG is the largest 5 Claimant in the Three Arrows Capital case and sits on the creditors committee by virtue of the assumption 7 (indiscernible). So there really can be no question or 8 suggestion that this existence of this agreement and the 9 relationship between the Debtors DCG that led to it was 10 well-known to the -- to (indiscernible). 11 THE COURT: All right. So I'm assuming that from 12 your point of view there really should've been a 2004 13 request made before the claims bar date seeking this kind of 14 information, and maybe they filed the claim to just get a 15 handle on it, and that that was the way to go. 16 MR. BAREFOOT: Or Your Honor, they could do what 17 they did with respect to the Grayscale claims. At least put 18 a placeholder down so that we can take contested matters in 19 our agreement. But you can't do (indiscernible). 20 THE COURT: All right. All right. Thank you, Mr. Barefoot. Unless you have anything else, I'll hear from the 21 22 Committee.

MR. BAREFOOT: Thank you.

MR. WEST: Good morning, Your Honor. Just for the record, Colin West of White and Case for the Official

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Committee. Given that our objection here is on the basis of preservation of estate resources, I will be brief. You've covered quite a bit with Mr. Mohebbi and Mr. Barefoot. But this is, Your Honor, a waste of estate resources.

Fundamentally, there is a 2004 motion for the purpose of collecting discovery relating to claims that Three Arrows admits have not been timely asserted. The -- I think the

briefing is before Your Honor about the sufficiency or the extent to which the claims would or would not relate back.

We obviously would support the Debtor's arguments that the claims would not relate back. And the only thing I

isolation. Whatever you might do in a different context,

Your Honor, in this case, the specific purpose, according to

been had about what do we do with the Rule 2004 standard in

want to add, Your Honor, is as to this discussion that's

Mr. Mohebbi, of taking the 2004 discovery is to amend -- is

potentially to amend the claims to assert a new claim based

on the assignment assumption agreement.

In that context, it cannot be the case that you have to put blinders on as to whether the proof of claim could be amended in the first place, right? So it does come down to whether these claims would or would not relate back. It has to as a practical matter. And for the reasons stated in the objection, the claims don't relate back, which again, makes this an exercise in futility from our perspective.

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We also, Your Honor, can't help but observe that this is another request for relief, another request for discovery. All the while at the same time Three Arrows -- not to get off track, but all the while Three Arrows is seeking to have all of these claims heard in an another forum.

So stepping back from a global perspective, we think this 2004 motion is reflective of a rather scattershot and wasteful approach to bringing claims and seeking discovery in this court, and we oppose the 2004 motion for the reasons stated in the Debtor's objection and in our (indiscernible).

questions. One is same question I asked Mr. Barefoot about the state of play in terms of the briefing. Because relation back sort of came out nested inside several other frameworks, the 2004 framework, and discovery for a contested matter, and all those discussions, and then we got to that. Is -- one of the things I don't think is good is to make decisions on records that parties might later say, well, we didn't have that motion and the judge didn't have all of the facts. Is there anything you think I'm missing that might be beneficial to lay out?

Again, it didn't -- the papers I have, while they address the issue, they don't quite look the way it would

look if somebody was filing a motion to amend, and that isn't necessarily dispositive on this question whether there's something missing. But is -- do you have a view about whether any additional briefing on that question would be helpful if that's the issue that this all devolves down to in your view?

MR. WEST: So I think, Your Honor, if you look at the Debtor's objection, I think they laid out with a fair amount of specificity why the -- any claims relate -- I think it's a -- theoretically a fraudulent transfer claim arising from the assignment assumption agreement. I think the debtors did lay out why that is really fundamentally distinct from the claims that have been asserted or that were preserved in the proof of claim. I think certainly that could be fleshed out more in supplemental briefing if that's -- you know, if the Court believes that it doesn't have enough information.

THE COURT: Well, I guess --

MR. WEST: But the --

THE COURT: -- since you know it -- since you know the facts better than I do, I guess I'm wondering whether there is more. So there are times when a relation back amendment question delves very much into exactly what a claim or a complaint says, and you end up parsing very finely often specific clauses or sentences. What I'm

getting the sense here is that that's not a -- an analysis that's missing because it's not really the way this is laid out.

Like from your point of view, there is nothing.

There is no specific language to parse other than the reservation of rights on which somebody might hang something. And so again, I'm thinking about what briefing might look like, but it also could very much be that, well, that's not this case. You're not going to get that kind of analysis because that's not the way -- no one's -- and again, you could maybe take the view that no one's presented something to me that suggests that there is briefing to be done on that issue.

So again, I'm just trying to throw out some ideas about what, when looking at this, where I was just like, hmm, this is a discussion I'm not seeing. But maybe that discussion is just not one we'd have in this particular set of facts.

MR. WEST: I think that's right, Your Honor. I think that the standard for relation back is whether the Debtor was put on sufficient notice such that the amendment would not be an unfair surprise. And we think clearly here, and you know, subject to Three AC's -- you know, any argument Three AC wants to make about why they did put the Debtor on notice of a fraudulent transfer claim in the

Page 46 1 assignment and assumption agreement, we don't think there's anything there in the proof of claim that would've put 3 anyone on notice that those facts around the assignment and 4 assumption agreement would become an issue for a future 5 claim, or that there would be legally anything like a 6 fraudulent transfer claim. 7 So we don't think there really is anything in the 8 proof of claim that's going to generate a lot of interesting briefing on this issue. But we are certainly happy to brief 10 it should the Court find it necessary. 11 THE COURT: All right. 12 MR. WEST: And I don't -- if the Debtors would 13 like to, I suspect they are as well. 14 THE COURT: Yeah, no, I think --15 MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor --16 THE COURT: -- Mr. Barefoot said that as well. 17 let me ask you one other question that I didn't ask Mr. 18 Barefoot, but I think I will before I return for sort of the 19 reply from Three Arrows. There was a mention by Three 20 Arrows about, well, if we don't get this information here, 21 don't preclude us in the Chapter 15 from requesting it 22 there. And obviously, the Chapter 15 is not in front of me, 23 and that's not my responsibility. 24 And so what is your reaction to that? And I 25 mention it just in the context of we're having a discussion

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Page 47 of efficiency. And so to the extent that you sometimes in litigation have a whack-a-mole problem, if you address something here, it pops up somewhere else. So do you have a view on Three Arrows' comments that way? MR. WEST: So Your Honor, I think -- and I'd want it -- you know, I could in fact, Your Honor, I don't know exactly what is before the Court with respect to that specific issue. In other words, I don't know whether this is a theoretical issue or whether this is an issue that the Court has to decide now as to whether --THE COURT: No, no. I guess I'm not even --MR. WEST: Yeah. THE COURT: Let me be more precise. MR. WEST: I understand. THE COURT: I'm not asking about anything I would do. And I don't think I have it in front of me. was a comment made, and really, I took it in the following way, which is if you rule in favor of the Debtors and the Committee, the consequence might be that, Judge, we make this application in a different, and that we just want you to be aware of that. And so again, it's not a decision for me to make, but I took it as a comment that someone wanted me to take into account in thinking about the efficiency issues.

MR. WEST: So I think my reaction to that, Your

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Honor, would be if the 2004 discovery is futile because it relates to a claim that has not been timely asserted and would not relate back to the existing proof of claim, I think that's going to be the case regardless. So whether this -- there's going to be a formal ruling here or not, I think as to whether they could seek the discovery in the 2004, I think the same rationale would sort of underpin the decisions in both cases.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much for that. And I'll hear from Mr. Barefoot on that issue if he has anything distinct to say. He might not, and he may be singing from the same sheet of music as Mr. West.

MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, Luke Barefoot for the Debtors. I agree entirely with Mr. West that the assumption that what we would do if we were faced with that scenario, it does seem particularly inefficient and smells a bit like forum shopping. But I think what Mr. West said makes sense, that if the -- there's no reason why the ruling or the rationale would be different here as opposed to what (indiscernible).

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. So with that, I'll turn back to Three Arrows Capital for any comments to respond to the discussions we've just had. And maybe we can start with the last -- one of the last questions, which was is there anything missing from your

view in the briefing and presentation of the relation back issue. Everybody thinks it's important. There's a lot of briefing. And I -- because this is not a motion to amend, it comes in, in a certain way. And I just want to make sure that nobody feels like their rights have been -- that there's something they would want to otherwise say based on the fact that --

MR. MOHEBBI: Well --

THE COURT: -- it was raised in the objection in a fulsome way and addressed in the reply in a fulsome way. My suspicion is the answer is no. But again, I don't want anyone to be surprised. So what's your thought on that?

MR. MOHEBBI: Your Honor, I mean, the answer is that if -- the question before you as conceded by Mr.

Barefoot is this is a 2004 motion. They have not cited a single case where a court has basically decided the merits of the ultimate claim, including that this case, whether it's time barred on a Rule 2004 motion. Not a single case (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: No, I understand your legal argument on that, and I will have to think about that argument, and make a decision on that argument. I understand that that's -- that there's case law on Rule 2004 on that front, and that's certainly an argument I'll need to address and come to a conclusion on. What I have to do, of course, and since

I have the benefit of you nice people here today, I have to ask questions that could -- I could potentially run into in -- you know, a decision tree looks like a lot of different things. So I try to ask all the questions, and then we'll see where -- how I put the pieces together.

And so I understand you're not waiving that argument, and I understand that that's your view. But if for some reason I do end up having to make a -- some kind of a decision on that issue, is there anything more that you think Three Arrows Capital would want to say?

MR. MOHEBBI: Absolutely. I think we would want to lay out in meticulous detail, in fact, beyond just the reservation of rights, the instances that show why this would relate back based on both the objection to our proof of claim and what was mentioned in our proof of claim. For example, in our proof of claim, we mentioned that the assignment agreement should not relieve Genesis of liability. And so the notion that they had no notice or no idea that this claim could -- or a claim like this could be presented, it's just not factually accurate.

The other point that I would make is that we've all been operating with this assumption that we're talking about a fraudulent conveyance claim. That's certainly one of the potential claims we might assert based on this discovery. It's not the only claim. And I keep coming back

to emphasize because of how strange the situation really was. If you look at the circumstances -- and to be fair, I think this was before counsel at Cleary got involved in the case. What happened here was really shocking in some ways. We're talking about, you know, in the wake of a liquidation assigning hundreds of millions of dollars in claims --

THE COURT: Well, but that's the -- that's -you're asking me to have the merits or demerits of the
underlying claim affect this thing, and that's not the -that's putting the cart before the horse. So I have to get
through --

MR. MOHEBBI: Exactly.

THE COURT: -- these things first. And so -- and

I'm sure the Debtors will have a different view on that.

But we'll get there. So I guess my question -- I'm looking

at the -- let me get the reply in front of me, and I'm

trying to figure out -- because I am trying to do this

efficiently. And again, I'm not -- I'm sort of walking a

fine line here. I'm not suggesting the briefing I've gotten

is insufficient on the question of relation back.

What I was trying to suggest is it's not how the discussion started. It started with the sort of traditional parameters of Rule 2004 and then spread from there. And so when I look at the papers, I do see lengthy discussions on -- so in your reply on Page 5, 6, 7, I think all the way to

the end of it on Page 11. So there is a lot of -- a lot that's packed in there. So I guess the question is what -- what's not there, and if so, what -- why wasn't it stuck in a reply.

So again, I'm -- I don't want to look like I'm arguing both sides of the issue about further briefing, but I have learned from my own time as a lawyer that if a judge says what about further briefing, the answer reflexively usually is, yes, Judge, we'll get you additional briefing.

And sometimes --

MR. MOHEBBI: Yes.

THE COURT: -- judges can do damage to things in that. So I'm not suggesting additional briefing is necessary. I am, however, trying to make sure that there's no procedural defect in the way things are teed up for me to make a decision on any and all of the issues that have been raised by the papers. So with that, I would ask -- with that prelude, with -- for your views on the question of what else would you discuss, and is there a need to -- for further briefing.

MR. MOHEBBI: I'll be candidly honest. If you're going to rule in favor of us, we don't need any additional briefing. I was partly joking there, Your Honor, but the reality is, you know, if we are going to delve into this question of relation back in the sense that it's going to

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result in a merits based determination, we would like the opportunity, if Your Honor's inclined to rule against us, to explain and to lay out this entire discussion in the normal way that one would do in the context of an amendment.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. MOHEBBI: And that's just --

THE COURT: -- again, and now I look like I'm going back on what I was discussing before, but there is -- if you take away the trappings and the bracketing of this in Rule 2004, when you get to Page 5 and 6, it -- that does look like it is, hey, a -- I mean, Roman Numeral II is that these claims would be permitted as amendments to timely filed claims, and then on the next Page 1 it says fraudulent transfer of claim would relate back to the Three Arrows claims. And then it goes through specific parts of the claim.

So Paragraph 6, for example, and so -- and also makes references to Paragraph 5, 7, 9 through 10. So I guess what I'm asking is there something specific that you would want to address that's not addressed here?

MR. MOHEBBI: I think additional cases that address some of these -- some of the issues that Mr. Barefoot and Mr. West have raised, I think we want to reemphasize the extent to which this was raised in the --

THE COURT: Well --

Page 54 1 MR. MOHEBBI: -- (indiscernible). 2 THE COURT: -- reemphasize... MR. MOHEBBI: Well, sorry. Not reemphasize. I 3 should say emphasize and --4 5 THE COURT: By -- again, we're talking about --6 MR. MOHEBBI: -- contextualize --7 THE COURT: -- unrelated and related and now 8 emphasizing and reemphasizing. 9 MR. MOHEBBI: Correct. 10 THE COURT: I got the emphasis in the first 11 instance. So that's what I'm trying to avoid is pleadings 12 that actually just cost people money and don't add anything 13 14 MR. MOHEBBI: Yeah. 15 THE COURT: -- but people feel duty bound to do 16 them because there's a suggestion the judge said, well, 17 there's -- we're not sure what we're briefing. And again, I've been on the other side of this. We're not sure what 18 19 additional things we're briefing, but we're not going to let 20 the opportunity to go by. And so that's a cruel and unusual 21 thing to do to lawyers having been on the other side of 22 that. And so I'm trying to avoid that. 23 MR. MOHEBBI: No, I understand, Your Honor. And I 24 hope you understand kind of the box that I'm in here --25 THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

Page 55 1 MR. MOHEBBI: -- in the sense that --2 THE COURT: I do. 3 MR. MOHEBBI: -- I want --THE COURT: So here's what I'd like to do. 5 MR. MOHEBBI: -- to make sure --6 THE COURT: I haven't heard anything in the 7 argument today that suggests that there's additional factual 8 development beyond the explanation of the claims and sort of 9 how you connect the dots. I -- so maybe one way to do this 10 is to say if people want to, in light of the discussion 11 today, submit, you know, up to three to five cases that if 12 you think there's additional cases that, given the way the 13 argument developed, that are worthwhile, I'm happy to take 14 that. And then that way, people can do something that's 15 productive. 16 At the same time, you don't feel like you've got a 17 pen in your hand metaphorically speaking but you don't 18 really know what it is you want me to brief. And I don't 19 want to do that and sort of send people out to -- again, 20 there are times when a motion to amend, they can look all 21 sorts of different ways, but they can sometimes be -- have a 22 particular parsing of very specific clauses. 23 I don't -- that doesn't appear to be the case 24 There -- you've cited to the aspects of the claim 25 where, in your view, that you've put people on notice of

what you have. And I have those, and so I think that that's fine. So unless somebody has a better idea, what I'll do is I'll give parties a chance to submit -- and you can just submit the actual cases -- three to five cases on -- that follow up on any of the points that we discussed here today that you think would be particularly helpful.

So for example, if somebody happens to stumble upon a wonderful dissertation on how you consider sort of unrelated, for purposes of Rule 2004, versus related for purposes of relation back, that would be wonderful. And if you have any other cases, that would be fine. So let's split the baby that way. And with that, anything else from Three Arrows Capital here this morning?

MR. MOHEBBI: No. I guess just would want to emphasize as a party note the -- you know, there was a lot of discussion about, you know, DCG being on the Creditors Committee and so forth. But I just want to emphasize that this is all -- we're talking about a very short period of time. I mean, the Debtors filed their claims, you know, I guess early this year. We -- the claim objection deadline was within five months of that.

The reality is it's not just about knowing the circumstances of a claim like this, which could potentially be explosive. And we're not in the business of making explosive allegations against Hardees even as a --

Page 57 1 THE COURT: Well, let's steer clear of things like 2 explosive when you're asking for information to --3 MR. MOHEBBI: All right. THE COURT: -- figure out whether you have a 4 5 claim. That seems --6 MR. MOHEBBI: Well --7 THE COURT: That seems --8 MR. MOHEBBI: But that's exactly --9 THE COURT: That seems to be not an appropriate 10 thing to throw out adjectives. Claims are claims. They are 11 what they are. If you don't know whether you have a claim, 12 then your request is judgment. We think it's appropriate 13 for us to get the information to figure out whether we have 14 a claim. I get it. So --15 MR. MOHEBBI: I was just responding to Mr. 16 Barefoot's comment that, you know, we should've preserved --17 we should've put in our amended proof of claim we may have a 18 claim that, you know, DCG defrauded us essentially, or with 19 which we did with Grayscale because there's -- there is an 20 actual lawsuit that has been filed by Grayscale 21 shareholders. So we had a basis to basically say, look, we 22 may have claims like this because we were similarly situated 23 holders of the Grayscale trust. 24 That was not the case with respect to this other 25 So mere -- you know, we're talking about a five- to issue.

seven-month period where we diligently -- our clients -- the short liquidators diligently evaluated all of these things, but that goes beyond just evaluating fact. It goes to evaluating legal theories as well. And so we followed the proper steps. And there's absolutely -- again, there's no prejudice here at all to the Debtors. We're -- I mean, you know, we're talking about a very short period of time for documents.

There's probably been more effort expended in, you know, the many people here on the call today than there would be in actually searching and producing the documents. So I just want to emphasize that because I do think that the liquidators are in a very unique situation as a Debtor themselves, representing the Debtor themselves, who don't have any founders who have cooperated with them. They don't have any (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: No. I do think we all understand that you've had some significant challenges, and I don't know that anybody disputes any of that. So my thought is I'll get through this. If there's anything I need, I do reserve the right if there's anything I feel like when I analyze things if there's additional questions or information I need, I'll ask. And you know, I can give people, you know -- if you can get me those cases next week, say, you know, a week from today, what three -- whatever you want to do. I

don't want to wreck anybody's life to get it done sooner.

So just submit it to me when you get a chance, but no later than a week, and that would be fine.

MR. MOHEBBI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

MR. BAREFOOT: Just one point of clarification on the additional submissions. I think (indiscernible), Your Honor, that you just want any new cases, just the cases themselves. No supplemental (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Exactly. Because I understand putting you in that -- and that's, again, I think I was fairly inartful in doing this, but I'm trying not to put you in a box that's unproductive for everybody. Because if you're doing additional briefing, you're doing it for me. And so I don't know that I was crystal clear on the issue. But what I'm saying is I just wanted to make sure that we're in the right posture and I have everything I might need. Based on the argument, I think I do.

And but given the way this has evolved, I can see that there may be -- and the questions that I had, I can see that might be helpful for folks to identify particular cases on issues that didn't make their way into the briefing, and that's fine. So all right. With that, let me ask, Mr. Barefoot, do you have anything else to discuss here today?

MR. BAREFOOT: No, Your Honor. And the deadline

that you suggested of a week from today is fine for the Debtors if it's acceptable to the Creditors.

THE COURT: All right. So that's a good segue to

Three Arrows Capital. Anything else from Three Arrows? And

does a week work for you?

MR. MOHEBBI: Nothing else, and yes, it does, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And anything else from the Committee?

MR. WEST: Nothing else, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So I'll leave you with one parting thing. I do anticipate getting a decision, a written a decision out today or latest Tuesday that approves the settlement that's pending under Rule 9019 with FTX. I think I had signaled as much on the bench, but I know it's always helpful to know these things. And so obviously, it'll get -- you'll get notification of it when it gets filed, but I just wanted to give you the heads up.

And with that, thank you all for your arguments and again for your willingness to engage in a back and forth of my questions, which often hop around a lot, and ruin what I'm sure are otherwise beautiful and perfect presentations that flow so wonderfully. So I appreciate your patience and good humor in letting me kind of jump around. It is helpful for me, so thank you very much. And with that, all of you

Page 61 have a great day. MR. BAREFOOT: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. MOHEBBI: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. WEST: Thank you, Your Honor. (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 11:28 AM)

Page 62 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 Songa M. deslarski Hydl 6 7 8 Sonya Ledanski Hyde 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Veritext Legal Solutions 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 23 Mineola, NY 11501 24 25 Date: October 11, 2023